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Utsa Patnaik*
Theorizing Poverty and
Food Security in the
Era of Economic Reforms
Introduction
The correct theorizing of the questions of food security and poverty 
has become particularly important at the present time, which is one 
of rapid changes in the economic environment in which small produc-
ers including farmers and workers are living. in a poor developing 
country, the incidence of poverty is very closely linked to the availabil-
ity of food, in which the staple food grains still remain predominant, 
accounting for three-fifths of the daily energy intake of the popula-
tion. The measurement of poverty in india has traditionally adopted a 
nutritional norm specified in terms of an average daily energy intake 
measured in calories. The National Nutrition Monitoring bureau has 
informed us that 
the NNMb has consistently confirmed in successive surveys that the 
main bottleneck in the dietaries of even the poorest indians is energy 
and not protein as was hitherto believed… the data also indicates that 
the measurement of consumption of cereals can be used as a proxy 
for total energy intake. This observation is of considerable signifi-
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cance as it helps to determine rapid, though approximate, estimates 
of energy intake at the household level (National Nutrition Monitor-
ing bureau, 1997). 
it is this strong link between the staple food grains intake and poverty 
based on a nutritional norm, which enables us to put forward an analy-
sis of the recent trends in food security and in poverty, in the light of 
the impact of changing economic policies during the last fifteen years.
The majority of academics and the Government of india today 
make two claims which i believe to be factually incorrect, claims 
which are underpinned by a wholly fallacious theoretical understand-
ing of the current situation. They claim first, that there is ‘over supply’ 
of food grains relative to demand, (which they assume to be growing 
normally) and so infer that food grains production should be cut back 
in favour of ‘diversification’; second, that poverty has been declining 
in india in the era of reforms, specifically in the1990s. My contention 
as regards both propositions is that they are incorrect, and that the 
correct position on theoretical and factual grounds is precisely the 
opposite. First, there is not over supply of food grains, but a decline 
in food grain supply and an even more drastic decline of effective de-
mand for food grains especially in rural india owing to an abnormally 
fast loss of purchasing power during the last six years: so, far from 
cutting back food grain output, the correct policy is to raise purchas-
ing power and restore effective demand as well as restore access to 
affordable food grains through a combination of a universal, and non 
targeted, employment guarantee scheme and through reverting to a 
universal, non targeted public distribution system.
second, far from the percentage of population in poverty declin-
ing as claimed, the factually correct position on the basis of current 
data is that poverty is very high, affecting at least three-quarters of 
rural and over two-fifths of the urban population. Moreover the data 
shows that the depth of poverty has increased considerably during the 
fifteen years of reforms, with more people being pushed down into a 
poorer nutritional status than before in most of the indian states and 
at the All-india level. The reason that many academics and the Plan-
ning Commission reach the conclusion that poverty is declining, is 
that they use an estimation procedure which has no basis on logic and 
is indefensible on academic grounds. What that estimation procedure 
is and how it differs from the correct procedure is one of the main 
questions i would try to explain, for i believe that it is part of the ‘right 
to information’ that the intelligent citizen should be able to independ-
ently reach a judgement about the validity of the official procedure 
and not simply take the truth of certain statements for granted. Thus 
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i will focus on the correct theorizing of these two main questions –of 
declining effective demand for food grains, and of the extent of pover-
ty. This has become extremely important because the widely prevalent 
incorrect theorizing in academic and government circles is leading 
to policy formulations and measures which will only serve to worsen 
mass welfare and plunge even larger sections of the rural population 
in particular into higher unemployment and food deprivation.
The first and second sections will briefly discuss the deflation-
ary macroeconomic policies combined with exposure to global price 
declines, which has led to massive loss of purchasing power in rural 
india in the last six years and is reflected in falling food grains absorp-
tion and falling energy intake. The third section discusses the inter-
pretation of the decline in food grain absorption while the fourth and 
last section takes up the question of poverty estimation and how of-
ficial and most academic estimates use a particular indirect method of 
estimation, which completely de-links poverty from nutrition norms 
by ignoring current data which show the reality of rising nutritional 
deprivation and increasing depth of poverty.
What Deflationary policies and Trade Liberalization
have meant for the Rural Economy in India 
Deflationary macroeconomic policies are strongly favoured by interna-
tional and domestic financial interest groups who are quite obsessive 
about controlling inflation and would prefer to see even an economy 
with a high rate of unemployment, growing slowly and raising unem-
ployment further, rather than risk any possibility of prices rising owing 
to expansionary policies reducing unemployment. international credi-
tors wish to maintain high real values of their financial assets and high 
real interest rates (inflation would erode both) - and are happy with 
bouts of asset deflation in developing countries so that these assets can 
be snapped up at low prices by their corporations. Their insensate and 
obsessive fear of inflation can be seen in the policies advised uniformly 
by the international Monetary Fund to 78 developing countries in the 
1980s and summarized in Table 1 from an iMF study. The first three 
policies –restraint on central government expenditure, limits on credit 
expansion, and reduction of budget deficit to GDP ratio, add up to a 
strongly deflationary package and all three were actually implemented 
at the same time by four-fifths of the countries concerned, while two-
thirds capped wages and over half devalued their currency. 
The results of deflationary policies of the decade up to the mid-
1980s have been documented as sharp decline in rates of investment 
in both capital formation and in the social sectors, leading to reduced 
or negative GDP growth and negative impact on the human develop-
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ment indicators (see in particular Cornia, Jolly and stewart, 1987). 
A number of studies since then have confirmed the adverse impact 
and have argued for expansionary policies (baker, Epstein and Pollin, 
1998; halevy and Fontaine, 1998; Patnaik, 2000).
india has been following exactly the same deflationary package of 
policies since 1991, whose impact has been especially severe in in-
dia’s agricultural sector which saw sharp reduction in planned pub-
lic development expenditures in rural areas, which has traditionally 
included agriculture, rural development, irrigation and flood control 
–all vital for maintaining output– to which we add also the outlays 
on special area programmes, and village and small scale industry to 
define overall ‘Rural Development Expenditures’ or RDE. The employ-
ment- generating programmes had assumed a special importance 
from the drought year 1987 onwards. 
Percentage of Total Number of Countries 
Implementing Policy
Restraint on Central Government Expenditure
Limits on Credit Expansion
Reduction in Ratio of Budget Deficit to GDP
Wage Restraint
Exchange Rate Policy
91
99
83
65
54
Table 1
Policies Followed by 78 countries under Fund-guided Economic Reforms
Source: IMF study quoted in Cornia, Jolly and Stewart (eds) Adjustment with a Human Face 1987, Vol..1, p.11.
1985-90 1993-4 1995-6 1997-8 2000-1
1.Rural 
Development 
Expenditures as 
Percent of NNP
3.8 2.8 2.6 2.3 1.9
2.Above plus 
Infrastructure
11.1 8.4 6.9 6.4 5.8
Table 2
Reduction in Rural Development Expenditures under Economic Reforms, Selected Years 1985–90 to 2000–01
Source: Government of India, Ministry of Finance, annual Economic Survey, for years 2001–02 to 2003–04, Appendix Table S-44. 
‘Rural development expenditures’ here are the plan outlays of Centre and states under the five heads of agriculture, rural development, 
irrigation and flood control, special areas programmes, and village and small scale industry. Infrastructure includes all energy and 
transport including urban. Calculated from current values of expenditure and NNP at factor cost.
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over the 7th Plan period marking the pre-reforms phase, from 1985 to 
1990, Rs.51,000 crores was spent on rural development, amounting 
to almost 4 percent of Net National Product, and Rs. 91,000 crores 
or over 7 percent of NNP was spent on infrastructure1. by the mid- 
1990s, annual spending on rural development was down to 2.6 percent 
of NNP, and after including infrastructure, less than 7 percent was be-
ing spent compared to 11 percent during the 7th Plan. Further declines 
took place so that by 2000-01 the share of spending under these heads 
was down to 5.8 percent of NNP, the rural development part halving 
to only 1.9 percent (see Table 2). The per capita expenditures obvi-
ously declined even more sharply. i estimate that in constant 1993-4 
prices about Rs.30,000 crores less was being spent by the end-decade 
year 1999-2000, compared to the beginning, 1990-91. A crude point-
1 in infrastructure we are including the expenditures on Energy and Transport.
Period Foodgrains Non-Foodgrains AllCrops Population
1980-81
to
1989-90
2.85 3.77 3.19 2.1
1980-81
to
1989-90
1.66 1.86 1.73 1.9
Table 3
Decelerating Growth rates of Agricultural Output
Source: Govt of India, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey, 2001-02, p.189. Note that slowing down of output growth is much steeper 
than slowing down of population growth implying falling per head output.
Year
1983
Year
1993-1994
Year
1999-2000
Growth per Annum
1983 to            1993-4 to
1993-4             1999-00
1.Population, mn. 546.6 658.8 727.5 1.79                 1.67
2. Labour force, mn. 204.2 255.4 270.4 2.15                 0.96
3. Work force mn. 187.9 241.0 250.9 2.40                 0.67
4. Unemployed mn. 
(2-3)
16.3 14.4 19.5 -1.19               5.26
Table 4
Employment Decline in Rural India
Source: Govt. of India, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey 2002-03, p.218.
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to-point comparison would suggest an annual income loss of between 
120,000 to 150,000 crores of rupees assuming a multiplier value be-
tween 4 and 5. Actual income loss would have been greater taking 
the cumulative losses over successive years. This harsh contractionary 
policy had nothing to do with any objective resource constraint but 
simply reflected the deflationary policies of the bWi which were inter-
nalized and sought to be justified by the indian government.
 There is no economic rationale for believing that “public invest-
ment crowds out private investment” which is the common argu-
ment put forward for reducing the state’s role in rural development. 
Precisely the contrary has been shown to hold for certain types of 
investment essential for an irrigation-dependent agriculture like in-
dia’s such as irrigation projects of all types. Private tube-well invest-
ment is profitable only where the water table remains high owing to 
seepage from state-built canal irrigation systems, and where com-
munity integrated watershed management (planting trees and using 
check-dams) is encouraged with state help. Private over-exploitation 
of ground water has now reached a crisis point in many states in 
india, with the water table falling rapidly and with even the richest 
farmers unable to reach water after investing heavily in deep bore-
wells and submersible pumps. other infrastructure investment such 
as rural power projects, roads, bridges, school buildings, clinics and 
so on, are never undertaken by private investors but are vital for 
stimulating development and providing livelihoods both directly to 
those employed in building them and through the important mul-
tiplier effects on employment and incomes, of the increased wage 
incomes being spent on simple consumer goods and services within 
the villages. The market for machine made textiles and other goods 
also thereby expands.
The net result of the unwise cut-back of public investment and in 
RDE has been a slowing of the rate of output growth –both food grain 
and non-food grain growth rates almost halved in the nineties com-
pared to the pre-reform eighties, and both have fallen below the popu-
lation growth rate even though this too is slowing down (Table 3). This 
has led to declining per capita output during the nineties, for the first 
time since the mid-sixties agricultural crisis, which however had been 
short- lived, whereas per head agricultural output continues to fall to-
day even after a decade: The Agricultural Universities had earlier played 
a major role in developing and helping to disseminate new crop varie-
ties, and the cut in funding for research in these Universities by affect-
ing the search for better rain-fed crop varieties, has also contributed to 
the deceleration in the growth of yields. With increasing use of land for 
commercial and residential purposes, the gross sown area in india has 
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remained static since 1991, so it is only through yield rise that output 
growth can be maintained and it is here that the failure is evident.
The combination of decline in state RDE and the near-halving of 
agricultural growth has produced a major crisis of rising unemploy-
ment. There is both fast growing open unemployment and a fall in 
number of days employed of the work force during the economic re-
form period. Even with constant labour coefficients (labour days used 
per unit of crop output) a near halving of employment growth was to 
be expected given the decline in crop output growth, but the decline 
in jobs has been even more as mechanization especially of harvesting 
and use of herbicides has led to falling labour coefficients. Further-
more the rural non-farm employment growth, which was robust in 
the 1980s owing to reasonably high state RDE, had declined in the 
nineties. The ratio of labour force to population, or the participation 
rate, has declined (lower participation rate reflects difficulty of finding 
work), the ratio of work force to labour force has declined because 
open unemployment has been growing at over 5% annually (Table 4). 
The elasticity of employment with respect to output was 0.7 during 
1983 to 1993-4 but has declined to 0.01 or virtually zero, taking the 
reforms period 1993-4 to 1999-00. 
No-one should imagine that unemployed rural workers are mi-
grating and finding employment in industry: there have also been 
massive job losses in manufacturing during the reform period and the 
share of the secondary sector in GDP has fallen from 29 to around 22 
percent during the nineties, in short india has seen de-industrializa-
tion. The agricultural depression has reduced the share of agriculture 
in GDP from about a third at the beginning of the nineties to just over 
a fifth a decade later, but the labour force and population dependent 
on agriculture has hardly fallen reflecting decline in per head incomes. 
Thus both the material productive sectors have declined and the only 
sector which has ballooned in an abnormal manner2 is the tertiary or 
services sector which now accounts for over half of GDP.
only a small proportion of the services sector comprises iT-ena-
bled high income services, business process outsourcing, domestic 
tourism services and the like. The major part in employment terms, 
is still low-productivity activities in which the rural displaced workers 
stagnate at low income levels, servicing the requirements of the up-
2 A rising contribution of services to GDP from an initial situation of a high share 
of industry to GDP has been typical for advanced economies. india however is seeing 
a fast shift to services from a relatively low initial share of manufacturing and min-
ing output, less than 30% of GDP, which is now down to about one-fifth. This shift to 
services reflects de-industrialization and worsening income distribution. 
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per income elites who have been improving their real income position 
fast. Disposable incomes have risen even faster for this segment since 
a part of the neo-liberal reforms include reduction in direct tax rates. 
Advanced countries usually have this upper-income 10 to 15 percent 
minority of indians in mind when they demand market access for 
their manufactures and agricultural products, and no doubt 100 to 
150 million people is a large potential market. but the situation of the 
vast majority of the mainly rural population who do not merely stag-
nate at low income levels but whose position is considerably worse 
today than a decade earlier, cannot be ignored: a potentially highly 
destabilising situation is in the making. 
While income and employment reduction through deflationary 
policies is the first main reason for loss of purchasing power in rural 
india, the second main reason is the unwise opening to global markets 
through full trade liberalization at a time from the mid-1990s, when 
global markets went into recession and primary product prices started 
falling –a fall which continues to this day. 
More Trade leads to more Hunger
in Developing countries under Global
and local Deflationary Conditions
The land resources of india, more so than in most developing countries, 
have the potential for producing a highly diversified range of products 
–not only the crops and fruits grown in the summer season in temper-
ate lands but also the typically tropical crops, which cannot be grown at 
all in advanced countries located in temperate regions. The crops of our 
lands have been demanded abroad in advanced countries for over three 
centuries for meeting their direct consumption and raw material needs. 
but, historically the growth of exports from tropical agriculture under 
free trade regimes, has always led to a fall in domestic food grains out-
put and availability, plunging the mass of the population into deepening 
under-nutrition and in extreme cases into famine. in the half-century 
before indian independence, per capita food grain output fell by nearly 
30 percent while export crops grew ten times faster than food grains. i 
have earlier discussed some historical and current cases in developing 
countries, of the inverse relation between primary sector exports and 
domestic foodgrains absorption (Patnaik 1996, 2003a).
This is bound to happen since land is not a reproducible resource, 
and heavy external demand made on our more botanically diverse 
lands by advanced countries to meet their ever-rising and diversifying 
needs, leads to diversion of our land and resources away from locally 
consumed food staples to meet export demands. The position is wors-
ened by exports out of more slowly growing food output itself. The 
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Ricardian theory of comparative advantage which says there is neces-
sarily mutual gain from specialization and trade, contains a material 
and logical fallacy since the conclusion is based crucially on assuming 
that ‘both countries produce both goods’ which is factually untrue for 
agriculture. The advanced countries mainly located in cold temperate 
regions cannot produce tropical crops at all, so the cost of production 
of say coffee or rubber cannot even be defined in these countries, let 
alone relative cost and transformation frontiers3 (Patnaik, 2005). 
in theory, more primary exports from developing countries can 
accompany more food production for domestic needs, but this can 
only happen when there is substantial rise in investment to raise pro-
ductivity, for land is a non-producible resource whose ‘supply’ can 
only increase via investment permitting one hectare to produce what 
two hectares did earlier. it also requires that mass domestic demand 
grows, and is not held in check by income-deflating policies or exces-
sive taxation as was the case under colonial systems. 
The deeply disturbing feature of the current thrust for liberalizing 
trade is that it has been taking place within an investment-reducing, 
deflationary regime. i predicted in 1992 that given the deflationary 
climate, food security would be undermined with trade liberalization 
in india and that is precisely what has happened. As soon as trade 
was liberalized from 1991, within a few years, 8 million hectares of 
food-growing land were converted to exportable crops leading to a fall 
in per head food grain output, but farmers did not benefit since their 
exposure to steeply falling global primary prices from mid-decade 
plunged them into spiralling farm debt and insolvency. Nearly nine 
thousand recorded farmer suicides in india since 1998 are only the 
tip of the iceberg –there is a pervasive agrarian crisis and food grain 
absorption in india is back to the level prevailing fifty years ago. 
Trade liberalization and an export thrust makes sense when local 
and global markets are expanding owing to expansionary developmen-
tal policies which promote growth in the material productive sectors, 
rising employment and incomes. but when the opposite is the case, 
when both globally and in local economies the dominant policy senti-
ment is strongly deflationary as at present, then trade liberalization 
spells lowered mass welfare in developing countries4. india’s experi-
ence in the last fourteen years provides a good illustration of this. 
india, as a signatory to GATT 1994, removed all quantitative restric-
tions on trade and converted to tariffs by April 2001, lowering the 
average tariff rate at the same time to 35%, or well below the bound 
3 A shorter version is available in Patnaik, U. (2003a).
4 see my discussion in Patnaik 1996, 2003c. 
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rates which were 100% for crops and 150% for agricultural processed 
products. india’s thrust for trade liberalization could not have been 
worsely timed, since advanced country markets were in recession and 
global primary product prices went into a free fall with a 40%-50% de-
cline in unit dollar prices of all crops –cereals, cotton, jute, sugar, tea, 
coffee– and up to an 80% decline in some oil crops between 1995 and 
2001 as Table 5 shows. With a brief rise in 2002 prices have continued 
to fall and some prices are today lower than as far back as 1986. The 
price to growers is even lower than world price as the activities of the 
state marketing boards have been replaced by private transnational 
companies for many crops. 
Table 5
Prices of some important traded primary products, in US dollars
Source: Food Outlook, Various issues from 1986 to 2001; available from Global Information and Early Warning System on Agriculture, 
U N Food and Agriculture Organization; and Monthly Commodity Price Bulletin, UNCTAD 2001. For the cereals, edible oils and seeds the 
unit is USD per ton, for cotton and sugar, US cents per lb. and for Jute, USD per metric ton.
* Relates to 1999, and percent change is 1999 compared to 1995.
The 2004 price data shows that sugar, cotton and jute prices continue to remain flat around 2001 levels while cereals show some rise.
1988 1995 1997 2000
2001
(Jan.)
Percent Change
2001 over 1995
Wheat (US HW) 167 216 142 130 133 - 38.2
Wheat (US RSW) 160 198 129 102 106 - 46.5
Wheat (Argentine) 145 218 129 112 118 - 45.9
Maize (Argentine) 116 160 133 88 80 - 50.0
Maize (US) 118 159 112 97 92 - 22.0
Rice (US) 265.7 - 439.0 271 291 - 33.7
Rice (Thai) 284 336 316 207 179 - 46.7
Cotton 63.5 98.2 77.5 66 49.1 - 50.0
Groundnut Oil 590 991 1010 788* - 20.5*
Palm Oil 437 626 93.5 74.7* - 88.1*
Soyabean Oil 464 479 625 71.4* - 85.1*
Soyabean Seed 297 273 262 199 178 - 34.8
Sorghum seed 110 156 111 102 99 - 36.5
Sugar 10.2 13.3 11.4 10.2 9.2 - 30.8
Jute 370 366 302 276* - 24.6*
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As prices fell for indian producers of export crops, their access to low-
cost credit was reduced under financial sector reforms. since the na-
tionalization of banks in 1969 agriculture and small scale industry 
had been treated as priority sectors and were offered bank credit at 
a lower than average interest rate but that ended with financial re-
forms, thrusting farmers into dependence on private moneylenders 
and high-cost credit (interest rates are usurious, ranging from 36% to 
60% annually). other crucial input prices including power tariffs were 
raised as part of the neo-liberal dicta on reducing subsidies (which 
were already meagre compared to developed countries). Reduced tar-
iff protection meant that producers of rice, fresh fruit and dairy prod-
ucts faced the undermining of their incomes from an influx of usually 
heavily subsidized foreign goods. 
Nearly six thousand indebted farmers, mainly cotton farmers, 
have committed suicide in Andhra Pradesh alone since 1998 as its 
government which had entered into a state-level structural Adjust-
ment Programme with the World bank, raised power tariffs five times 
even as cotton price fell by half (Table 6). over a thousand farmer sui-
cides have also taken place in Punjab, mainly in the cotton belt, new 
rounds of suicides are recorded in karanataka and Vidarbha, and in 
the four years from 2001, over 1,250 suicides are recorded in Wynaad 
in kerala as prices to the local growers of coffee, tea and spices have 
nose-dived even more steeply than global prices once large companies 
have taken over purchase and marketing. Thus by 2003 the price of 
coffee to the grower was only one-quarter and that of tea and pepper 
only one-third of the prices prevailing in 1999.
The agrarian crisis was the main reason for the decisive mass re-
jection of neo-liberal policies and the May 2004 electoral defeat of the 
NDA coalition at the Centre as well as the TDP government in Andhra 
Pradesh. in recognition of the employment crisis the new United Pro-
gressive Alliance or UPA had promised to implement a National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Act which has been recently formulated and 
passed, but which has been diluted by taking the household as the 
unit, where only one member is entitled to work, and by setting the 
wage below the statutory minimum wage.
india has exported record volumes of wheat and rice during the 
last six years, and its share in global exports of rice and wheat has risen 
quite noticeably. Despite the drastic slowing down of output growth 
noted in Table 3, india exported 22 million tonnes of food grains dur-
ing 2002 and 2003 (bhalla 2005), and the share of grain exports in 
total exports has risen from under one –fifth to almost a quarter. There 
is higher global trade integration reflected in rising trade-GDP ratio. 
During the severe drought year starting from monsoon 2002, despite 
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grain output being 30 million tonnes lower than in the previous year, 
from June 2002 to November 2003, a total of 17 million tonnes of food 
grains were exported by the former NDA government. superficially it 
looks as though policies of trade liberalization have ‘worked’.
however the crucial fact which is suppressed in official publications 
and in the writings of pro-reform economists, and this is true even 
Table 6
Suicides of farmers in Andhra Pradesh by district
No. District 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Total
1. Warangal 77 7 7 28 903 1022
2. Ananthapoor 1 1 50 50 10 112
3. Mahaboobnagar 14 2 25 10 - 51
4. Karimnagar 31 10 6 30 1220 1297
5. Guntur 32 10 1 6 - 49
6. Khammam 20 5 3 6 2 36
7. Medak 15 3 2 8 - 28
8. Adilabad 9 8 5 13 - 35
9. Nalgonda 5 1 10 11 8 35
10. Nizamabad 9 1 - 11 457 478
11. Rangareddy 5 - 3 6 - 14
12. Kurnool 4 4 2 4 - 14
13. Chittoor 3 - - 2 - 5
14. Krishna 4 1 1 3 1 10
15. Prakasham 1 3 - 2 - 6
16. West Godavari 1 - - 5 - 6
17. East Godavari - - 1 2 - 3
18. Sreekakulam - 1 - - - 1
19. Cuddapah - - - 4 - 4
20. Visakapatnm - - - 1 - 1
Unknown 2 1 - - - 3
Total 233 58 116 202 2601 3210 
Note: The total number of suicides up to 2004 is over five thousand. Data from police records up to Jan. 27, 2002, presented by Kisan 
Sabha at a symposium on farmer suicides held at Hyderabad (Andhra Pradesh), 3 February 2002 and attended by the author. The Table 
has been partially updated by incorporating information for the whole of 2002, so far available for the three districts only (Warangal. 
Karimnagar and Nizamabad) as reported in The Hindu, Hyderabad edition, Jan.6 2003. For the other districts the figures given in the 
last column continue to refer to a single month, January 2002. Additional suicides numbering 1700 have taken place since then, for 
which the district break-up is not yet available.
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after the elections and the change in government, is that the vastly in-
creased grain exports have been coming out of more and more empty 
stomachs as millions of rural labourers and farmers have suffered job 
loss and income decline. Food grain absorption in india today has 
reached a historic low as a result of the massive decline in purchasing 
power especially in villages owing to the combination of rising unem-
ployment, rising input and credit costs for farmers and exposure to 
global price declines. Loss of purchasing power is pervasive affecting 
both the 158 million wage-dependent workers as well as the 120 mil-
lion cultivating workers and their families. Targeting the food subsidy 
from 1997-8 by restricting supply of cheaper grain to only those offi-
cially identified as ‘below the poverty line’ has also added to the insti-
tutional denial of affordable food grains to the poor, not merely owing 
to mistakes of wrong exclusion from the set of the officially poor, but 
also owing to the gross official underestimation of the numbers in 
poverty, discussed at the end of the paper.
Large decline in Food grains Absorption per
Head is owing to Falling Purchasing power,
not ‘voluntary choice’
The per capita availability or absorption of food grains in india has 
declined alarmingly during the decade of deflationary neo-liberal eco-
nomic reforms, to only 155 kg. annually taking the three year average 
ending in 2002-03. This current level is the same as fifty years ago dur-
ing the First Plan period, and it is also the level seen during 1937-41 
under colonialism. This means that the food security gains of the four 
decades of protectionism up to 1991, have been totally reversed. 
After independence, from the early 1950s to four decades later, 
taking the 3 years ending 1991, the per capita food grain availabil-
ity had climbed slowly from 155 kg. to 177 kg. -the achievement not 
only of a ‘Green Revolution’ but of expansionary policies slowly rais-
ing mass incomes and demand, without too much rise in already high 
inequality. While the Green Revolution had many problems, its posi-
tive achievement in raising grain availability and absorption, should 
not be underestimated. All this was reversed from the early 1990s. As 
the new regime, of deflationary economic reform policies from 1991 
eroded mass employment and incomes, we find a decline of per capita 
absorption to 174 kg between 1995 and 1998 and a very steep fall after 
that to the current abysmally low 155 kg level. Forty years of success-
ful effort to raise availability has been wiped out in a single decade, 
with over four-fifths of the decline coming in the last six years5.
5 i have discussed this in more detail in Patnaik 2003b, 2004. 
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Availability or absorption, is calculated from the hardest data we 
have, on annual net output6 adjusted only for change in public stocks 
and in trade, so by definition it has to cover all final uses –direct use 
for consumption as grain and its products, use as feed for convert-
ing to animal products (a part of this is exported), and industrial use. 
Per head availability/ absorption (the two are used as synonyms) is 
now one of the lowest in the world, with only sub-saharan Africa 
and some least developed countries registering lower absorption than 
india. since urban india has been increasing average absorption and 
average calorie intake, it is rural india where the fall has been very 
steep. in comparison, China absorbed 325 kg. grains per capita (ex-
cluding tubers) in the mid-1990s compared to india’s less than 200 kg. 
at that time, Mexico absorbed 375 kg., European countries absorbed 
700 kg. or more and UsA absorbed 850 kg. Except under abnormal 
conditions of war or famine, grain absorption is always observed to 
rise as a country’s average income rises. This is why the fall in india is 
so unusual, and it is not being correctly theorized.
Although grain output per head fell by about 12 kg over the five 
years ending in 2002-03, as may be checked from Table 7 the per head 
absorption has fallen much more, by 21 kg over the same period. The 
average indian family of five members is absorbing 100 kg. less of food 
grains annually than a mere five years ago and since in urban india 
absorption has risen (calorie intake has also risen), it is the rural family 
which is absorbing even less than the average fall indicates. This abnor-
mal fall is because of the loss of purchasing power for reasons already 
discussed, and it was reflected in a massive build-up of unsold public 
food stocks, reaching 63 million tonnes by July 2002, nearly 40 million 
tonnes in excess of the normal stocks for that time of year. Rather than 
starting large-scale food-for work schemes to restore lost work and in-
comes, between June 2002 and october 2003, over 17 million tonnes 
of food grains were got rid of by the NDA government by exporting 
subsidized stocks to feed European cattle and Japanese pigs. 
There can be two very different ways that such huge food stocks 
can build up: demand growth is normal but output increases much 
faster, or alternatively output increase is normal, but demand reduces 
very fast owing to loss of incomes, and the demand curve shifts down-
wards. in both cases supply exceeds demand, but for very different 
reasons. As already shown output growth has not been normal but has 
actually gone down, so the first reason does not hold. it is mass effec-
6 The official practice for 50 years, which i have followed in Table 7 is to deduct 
12.5 percent from gross output in tonnes, of foodgrains (cereals plus pulses) on ac-
count of seed, feed and wastage, and to the net ouput so obtained, add net imports 
and deduct net addition to public stocks.
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tive demand, hence absorption which has declined to a much greater 
extent, so it is the second reason and not the first which accounts 
for the present paradox of increasing rural hunger and record grain 
exports. if rural demand had been maintained even at the 1991 level 
(forget about any increase) the absorption of foodgrains today would 
be 26 million tonnes higher than it is, and there would be no crisis in 
the agriculture of Punjab and haryana, which have lost an internal 
market to that extent in the last six years alone. instead of rural per 
capita calorie intake declining to below the urban average, as has been 
the case in the nineties, energy intake would have been maintained.
since all-india per capita income has been rising during the reform 
period, such a drastic fall in food grains absorption is clearly, only com-
patible with a drastic rise in the inequality of income distribution as 
we had earlier pointed out (Patnaik, 2003b). but rising inequality can 
also occur when all incomes are rising. Rising inequality per se is nei-
ther necessary nor sufficient for the observed drastic absolute decline 
in grain absorption7. The only scenario which is compatible with it, is 
a particular type of rise in inequality, namely absolute decline in real 
incomes and rise in absolute poverty, concentrated mainly in the rural 
areas, combined with a large rise in real incomes for the top fractiles of 
the population, concentrated mainly in urban areas. The data is partly 
reflecting this: one indicator is the decline in the per capita real expendi-
ture on consumption by the lowest four-fifths of rural population during 
the end- 1990s and a very sharp rise by the top one-fifth of urban popula-
tion, which has been noted by sen and himanshu (2005). but even these 
findings are likely to understate the true extent of income decline for 
the mass of the rural population (we have no direct data on incomes). 
This is because this mass has been obliged to lose assets to maintain 
consumption and stay alive, while the well-to do have been saving much 
more over and above their greatly enhanced real expenditure and have 
entered real estate and financial markets. in short, there are in addition 
to the changes in observed flow variables like expenditure, also stock ad-
justments going on, namely changes in the distribution of assets which 
are adverse for the poor and on which data is not available.
The official position is one of wholesale denial of these obvious 
facts and the creation of what can only be called a fairy tale, fit only 
for intellectual infants. it is argued that there is voluntary reduction in 
food grain intake and thus there is ‘over-production’ requiring a cut-
back in cereals output –a position not supported by the facts. The full 
7 Rising inequality is not necessary because we can have fall in grain absorp-
tion when all incomes are falling and inequality is unchanged. it is not sufficient 
because if with increasing inequality all incomes are rising, grain absorption will 
not fall. 
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fairy tale set out in official publications goes like this: every segment 
of the population is reducing demand for cereals because average in-
come is rising; (here, the increased income is assumed to be distrib-
uted in the same way as earlier, with no increase in inequality). People 
of all expenditure classes are voluntarily diversifying their diets away 
from cereals. The only reason that farmers continue to produce more 
cereals than demanded, and hence big stocks build up, is because too 
much output has been encouraged by ‘too high’ administered, mini-
mum support prices of cereals. so MsP should be cut, cereals output 
in excess of what is demanded at present should be discouraged and 
the output pattern in agriculture should be diversified to more com-
mercial export crops under the aegis of agro-businesses. 
This analysis is completely incorrect and is inconsistent with the 
hard facts of rising unemployment, falling output growth, impover-
ishment of farmers in debt and land loss, and resulting deep agrarian 
distress. it is dangerous in reaching policy conclusions which are the 
opposite of those required, and which if implemented will reduce food 
security further and pauperize even more farmers. 
To give an analogy, albeit an imperfect one, suppose that a patient 
has been wrongly diagnosed by a doctor and loses weight rapidly to 
the extent of 30 kg. The doctor then blames the tailor for making the 
clothes of the patient too big and advises that the old clothes should 
be thrown away and new ones sewn to fit his wasted body. such ad-
vice will certainly alarm the patient for it shows that an abnormal 
situation is being rationalized as normal and no treatment to restore 
the patient to health will be followed. The official position on food 
grain output and food security, regrettably shared by many academics 
who seem not to have applied their minds to the matter, is indicative 
of such illogical reasoning and is alarming indeed for farmers and 
labourers in distress. The official prescription of reducing MsP, end-
ing open-ended procurement and cutting back on output will worsen 
food deprivation and deepen poverty for the millions of farmers and 
labourers already in deep distress. The idea that price fall benefits ‘the 
consumer’ ignores the fact that three-fifths of consumers in a poor 
country are themselves rural producers or dependent for jobs on pro-
ducers, and deflation harms their incomes. 
it is an alarming scenario too for the farmers of Northern india who 
over the last four decades have been asked to specialize in food grain 
production, and have performed magnificently, selling their rising sur-
pluses uncomplainingly to the Food Corporation of india even when the 
domestic procurement price was far below world price in the 1970s and 
again in the decade up to the late 1990s. They have ensured cheap food 
to urban areas and food deficit regions by not seeking to maximize their 
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own incomes. Today, as a result of the official embracing and putting 
into practice of mindless deflationary policies which have reduced mass 
purchasing power, they have lost internal grain markets to the tune of 26 
million tonnes and are being given the irresponsible advice to ‘diversify’ 
and export to world markets even though these continue to be in reces-
sion, and even though all international organizations predict continuing 
fall in agricultural terms of trade up to 2009-10. Calculations by FAo 
shows that the terms of trade for agriculture globally, with 1990-91 as 
base year equal to 100, was about 50 by 2001, compared to over 200 in 
the 1970s. All projections up to 2009-10 by international bodies, show 
continued absolute price fall and further decline in terms of trade.
The question that is neither raised nor answered in official pub-
lications like the Economic Survey and the Reserve bank of india’s 
Report on Currency and Finance which articulate the fairy tale of vol-
untary diversification, is - how can people suffering employment loss 
and facing unprecedented crop price declines, be inferred to be better 
off and be voluntarily reducing cereals demand, and how is it that the 
current reduced level of total absorption of food grains per head of 
155 kg per annum, is not seen in any country except the least devel-
oped and sub-saharan African countries? The observed falling share 
of food expenditure in total expenditure for almost every expenditure 
group, is officially cited as proof of every income segment including 
the poorest diversifying diets and becoming better off, and seems to 
have persuaded some academics. No attention is paid to steadily fall-
ing average calorie intake in rural india as ‘diversification’ proceeds. 
The argument is quite fallacious and is based on a simple confusion 
between the necessary and sufficient conditions for improvement.
A falling share of food expenditure in total expenditure, as a well as a 
falling share of grain expenditure in food expenditure, are necessary, but 
not sufficient indices of the consumer becoming better off, particularly 
when we are considering, not an advanced country rich population, but 
a population already at a low standard of life. The food spending share 
of total spending can fall and is actually observed to fall, when people are 
getting worse off because their real income is constant or falling, since 
owing to greater monetization of the economy and higher cost of utilities 
they are forced to spend more on the bare minimum of non-food essen-
tials. Thus even when real income is unchanged over time, some food 
expenditure has to be sacrificed to buy fuel (which is jointly demanded 
with food grains), incur higher transport costs in search of work, incur 
higher health costs and so on. since the overwhelmingly large part of 
food expenditure itself is on staple grains, it is this which falls when food 
expenditure is cut. Data for sub-saharan African countries shows dietary 
‘diversification’ as per capita income declines. We observe a falling share 
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of calories from cereals and rising share from animal products, even as, 
with the large decline in cereal intake absolute calorie intake is seen to 
decline quite steeply (see Patnaik 2003b for a discussion). in effect, a 
sub-saharan Africa already exists in rural india today.
The official solution is inhumane in rationalizing increasing hunger 
as voluntary choice, basing its prescriptions on bad theory and fallacious 
reasoning. The only solution which is both humane and is based on sound 
economic theory, is to restore lost internal purchasing power through a 
universal Employment Guarantee and to revert to a universal Public Dis-
tribution system. The Finance Minister unwisely cut rural development 
expenditures drastically to only Rs.13.5 thousand crores last year – the 
same absolute sum as was spent fifteen years earlier in 1989-90. Rs. 13.5 
thousand crores is an all-time low of only 0.6 percent of NNP and this 
gratuitous act of deflation in the face of farm crisis, has worsened the 
problems of unemployment and hunger. it may be compared to the Rs, 
51,000 crores spent by the NDA in 2003-04 in the aftermath of drought, 
which sum itself was inadequate at 2.5 percent of NNP. 
To meet the 10th Plan budget estimates on rural development, the 
government now needs to spend at least Rs. 100,000 crores during fiscal 
2005-06 and 2006-07, of which up to Rs.30,000 crores should be on the 
national rural employment guarantee, and the remainder on the urgent 
and neglected needs of agriculture, rural development, irrigation and 
village and small scale industry. Although one lakh crores may sound 
a large sum it is still less than 4 percent of anticipated NNP in the next 
two years and inadequate for the needs of 700 million people, three 
fifths of the nation, whose fate depends on the government’s policy.
The bizarre official efforts to re-invent increasing hunger as free 
choice, are buttressed by spurious estimates of the population in pov-
erty, discussed in the last section.
Alternative Measures of Head-Count Poverty:
or, How to Count the Poor Correctly versus
Illogical Official Procedures 
Poverty studies in india since the early 1970s, have been based on 
the use of a ‘poverty line’ expenditure level, defined as that level of 
expenditure per capita per month on all goods and services, whose 
food expenditure component provided an energy intake of 2400 kcal 
per capita in rural areas and 2100 kcal per capita in urban areas. All 
persons spending below the poverty line expenditure are considered to 
be poor. The required daily allowance (RDA) of energy was specified 
by the indian Council for Medical Research and recommended by the 
Nutrition Expert Group to the Planning Commission in 1969. This is 
obviously a very minimalist definition of poverty, since no norms are 
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set for essential non-food items of spending such as on fuel for cooking 
and lighting, clothing, shelter, transport, medical care or education. 
The data base for estimating poverty has been the National sample 
survey Rounds on Consumption Expenditure which take the house-
hold as the sampling unit. These surveys present the distribution of 
persons by monthly per capita expenditure groups, and since the 
quantities of foods consumed and their calorie equivalents are avail-
able, they also present the calorie intake per capita per diem by ex-
penditure groups. That particular expenditure group whose food ex-
penditure met the calorie requirement in 1973-74, was identified and 
the relevant expenditure was defined as the poverty line expenditure 
(often this is mis-labelled as poverty line income, but we have no infor-
mation on income). Large sample surveys are carried out at five-yearly 
intervals, the latest available data being from the 55th Round relating 
Table 7
Summary of Annual per capita Foodgrains Output and Availability in India
in the Nineties (Three Year Average)
Three-yr.
Period
Ending in
Average
Population
Net Output
per Head
Net Availability per Head
Cereals Food Cereals Pulses Foodgrain
million Kg. grains Kg. Kg.
 Kg./ 
Year
Gms./ 
day
1991-92 850.70 163.43 178.77 162.8 14.2 177.0 485
1994-95 901.02 166.74 181.59 160.8 13.5 174.3 476
1997-98 953.07 162.98 176.81 161.6 12.6 174.3 477
2000-01 1008.14 164.84 177.71 151.7 11.5 163.2 447
2002-03 1050.67 153.85 164.09 142.91 10.12 153.0 419
Individual Year
2003-04* 1087.6 158.33 170.83 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2004-05* 1107.0 151.21 162.35 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Change in Per Capita Availability of Foodgrains, %
Triennium ending 1991-92 to Triennium ending 1997-98 - 1.6
Triennium ending 1997-98 to triiennium ending 2002-03 - 12.2
Total Change, 1991-92 to 2002-03. -13.6
Source: For output, trade and stocks, Reserve Bank of India, Report on Currency and Finance, various years; and Govt.of India, Ministry 
of Finance, Economic Survey, various years. For population, the annual compound growth rate of 1.89 % has been derived from the 
Census population totals for 1991 and 2001 and used to interpolate for inter-censal years. Before 1991 and from 2001 onwards, the 
population figures given in the Economic Survey have been used.
* Indicates provisional..
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to 1999-2000, from which the relevant data for All-india is reproduced 
in Table 8 using two published Reports of the Nss. 
A good idea of the current magnitude of head-count poverty can be 
obtained by the lay person without any calculations, simply by inspect-
ing the data in Table 8. Looking at the first, third and fifth columns, 69.7 
percent or say seven-tenths of the rural population of india, spending less 
than Rs.525 per month per person, was below the average calorie level 
of 2403 (nearly the same as the 2400 norm), which was obtained only 
by the next higher spending group of Rs. 525-615. since persons in the 
lower part of this group also obtained below 2400 calories, the poverty 
percentage is a bit higher than seven-tenths, and on plotting the data on 
a graph we obtain the more exact figure of 74.5 percent. Yet, the official 
Planning Commission figure of rural head-count poverty from the same 
data is only 27 percent! The difference between the estimate obtained by 
direct inspection of the latest data and the figure as given by the Planning 
Commission, is 47.5 percent, so nearly half of the actually poor rural 
population, about 350 million persons, are excluded from the set of the 
officially poor. Again, from direct inspection we see that about two-fifths 
of the urban population spending below Rs.575 per capita per month ob-
tained less than 2091 calories (very close to the 2100 urban norm) which 
was the average for the next higher spending group. The exact percentage 
in urban poverty on plotting the graph, is 44 percent. The Planning Com-
mission figure for urban poverty for the same year is only 23.5 percent. 
What explains this big difference? The Planning Commission has never 
officially given up the nutritional norm of 2400 calories. The majority 
of economists in india believe that this norm is still being followed. The 
reality is that the actual estimation procedure followed by the Planning 
Commission has de-inked its poverty estimates completely from the nu-
trition norm. The poverty line was obtained following the norm, only in 
1973-74 using the 28th Round Nss data, a date three decades in the past. 
For that year at prices then prevailing, the rural and urban poverty lines 
were Rs.49.09 and Rs. 56.64 per capita per month, since at these expendi-
tures the 2400 rural and 2100 urban calorie intake norms were satisfied. 
it was found that 56.4 percent of the rural and 49 percent of the urban 
population were below these poverty lines8.
For later years, strange though it may seem, no use was made of a 
single iota of the actual consumption data and calorie equivalents, 
thrown up by as many as five successive large-sample surveys (in 
1977-8, 1983,1988-9,1993-4, and 1999-2000). There was no official at-
tempt to update the poverty lines on the basis of the available current 
8 it is a curious matter of chance that poverty lines were Rs.49.1 and Rs 56.6 while 
the corresponding poverty percentages were 56.4 and 49.
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information on what expenditure was actually required to meet the 
nutrition norm. Rather, the three decade old poverty lines (Rs 49.1 
and Rs.56.6, rural and urban), were simply adjusted upwards by us-
ing a price–index, while assuming an invariant 1973-74 consumption 
basket. The adjusted poverty line was then applied to the cumulative 
distribution of persons by expenditure groups, in current Nss data to 
obtain the ‘poverty percentage’. Thus the current data was, and is be-
ing used selectively, with only the distribution of persons by expendi-
ture classes being used, and the associated energy intake part being 
ignored completely. The declining energy intake corresponding to offi-
cial poverty estimates are never mentioned, nor do academics follow-
ing the same method ever mention the lowered calorie intake corre-
sponding to their estimates (vide the papers in Economic and Political 
Weekly, 2003, special number tendentiously titled ‘Poverty reduction 
in the 1990s’ ). The credibility of official and similar academic poverty 
estimates would certainly come into question if the educated public at 
large was informed about how far below RDA (Required Daily Allow-
ance) the consumption standard has been continuously pushed down, 
by the official method. 
For example the official price-index adjusted poverty line for 
1999-2000 was Rs.328 only (about 6.7 times Rs. 49) and this has been 
applied to the first and last columns of Table 8 to read the population 
below this line which came to 27%. No attention was paid to the fact 
that at this expenditure a person could access at most only 1890 calo-
ries, over 500 calories per day below the RDA and nor is this fact ever 
mentioned to the public when poverty estimates are quoted by the 
Planning Commission. This amounts to suppression of information 
and is not an academically acceptable procedure. The same applies to 
the academics who follow the official method and who never allude to 
the lower and lower calorie intake inherent in their poverty lines.
Academics writing earlier (R. Nayyar 1991) however, had estimat-
ed poverty both by direct inspection of current data and by the official 
method, and had explicitly noted that the official poverty estimate di-
verged more and more over time from the much higher poverty percent-
ages yielded by current data. As the base year of the official method gets 
further back in time the divergence has assumed absurd proportions. in 
1993-4 the official price index adjustment method gave a rural poverty 
line of only Rs.205, and 37.3 % were below it in the 50th Round distribu-
tion of persons by expenditure groups, and so deemed to be ‘in poverty’, 
but the fact that at this poverty line only 1,970 calories per diem could 
be accessed (over 400 calories below the RDA) was never mentioned. 
inspecting the same current 50th Round data showed that 74.5% of 
persons had an intake below the RDA of 2400 calories, because their 
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monthly expenditure was below the Rs.325 at which the nutrition RDA 
could be accessed. Mehta and Venkataraman (2000) pointed out for the 
50th Round data, this large divergence between the results of applying 
the official definition, and following the official price-adjustment proce-
dure, in a short but significant paper. They do not refer to Nayyar (1991) 
who had already pointed out the divergence for earlier Rounds and had 
also analysed state-wise divergence, but unfortunately her book had not 
been accorded the importance it deserved. 
in 1999-2000 as we already noted the official estimate gives only 27.4 
percent in poverty because these are the persons spending below the 
price-index adjusted official poverty line of Rs.328, but again the fur-
ther lowering of the associated energy intake standard to 1890 calo-
ries, over 500 calories per day below RDA, is never mentioned. The 
same current 55th Round data shown in Table 8 continues to give 74.5 
percent of persons actually in poverty, namely with intake below 2400 
calories because their expenditure was below the Rs.570 required to 
access the RDA. (however, greater poverty depth is seen by 1999-00, 
with  more of the population moving below 2100 calories as compared 
to 1993-94, and 3 percent more being below 1800 calories). Thus in 
1993-4 the official method had left out 37.2 percent of the total rural 
population who were actually poor, while by 1999-2000 the official 
method was leaving out 47.4 of the total rural population or around 
350 million persons who were actually poor. Table 9 summarizes the 
official poverty lines, poverty percentages and the falling calorie in-
takes at poverty lines, and it gives the true poverty lines required to 
access the RDA, along with the poverty percentages. 
There is no theoretically acceptable basis to the official claims 
of poverty reduction in the 1990s. The basic point is that the method 
of comparison over time is not logically valid when the consumption 
standard is being altered, as is being done in the indirect estimates. 
The consumption standard in 1973-74 was 2400 calories at which 56% 
was in poverty, by 1993-94 the standard implicit in the official esti-
mate (37% in poverty) was down to 1970 calories, and in 1999-2000 
for the official estimate (27.4 %) it was even lower at 1890 calories. by 
the 60th Round, 2004-05 it is likely to be below 1800 calories and cor-
respond to less than one-fifth of rural population. We will once more 
hear spurious claims of further ‘poverty reduction’ without any men-
tion of the lowering of the energy intake.
how can anyone say how ‘poverty’ has changed over time using 
the above method? To give an analogy, when a set of runners are lined 
up in a row on a circular race track for a long-distance race, if the per-
son in the inner-most circle crosses the finishing rope first, it cannot 
be validly inferred that he has won the race: for the distance run by 
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Table 8
Percentage Distribution of Persons by Monthly Per Capita Expenditure (MPCE) Groups
and average Calorie Intake per diem, 1999-2000, All-India
RURAL
Monthly
per capita
Expenditure
Average
MPCE
Calorie Intake
per diem
Percent
of persons
Cumulative
percent of
Persons
Rupees Rupees Per capita. % Kg.
Below 225 191 1383 5.1 5.1
225- 255 242 1609 5.0 10.1
255- 300 279 1733 10.1 20.2
300- 340 321 1868 10.0 30.2
340- 380 361 1957 10.3 40.5
380- 420 400 2054 9.7 50.2
420- 470 445 2173 10.2 60.4
470- 525 497 2289 9.3 69.7
525- 615 567 2403 10.3 80.0
615- 775 686 2581 9.9 89.9
775- 900 851 2735 5.0 94.9
900 & more 1344 3178 5.0 99.9
ALL 486 2149 99.9
SUMMARY
470-525	 2289
and	less	 and	less	 69.7
525-615	 2403	 10.3
615-775	 2581	 19.9
and	more	 and	more
(continue)
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(continue)
URBAN
Monthly
per capita
Expenditure
Calorie Intake
per diem
Percent
of persons
Cumulative
percent of
Persons
Rupees Per capita % Kg.
Below 300 1398 5.0 5.0
300- 350 1654 5.1 10.1
350- 425 1729 9.6 19.7
425- 500 1912 10.1 29.8
500- 575 1968 9.9 39.7
575- 665 2091 10.0 49.7
665- 775 2187 10.1 59.8
775-915 2297 10.0 69.8
915-1120 2467 10.0 79.8
1120-1500 2536 10.1 89.9
1500- 1925 2736 5.0 94.9
1925 & more 2938 5.0 100
ALL 2156 99.9
SUMMARY
500-575	 1968
and	less	 and	less	 39.7
575-665	 2091	 10.0
665-775	 2187	 50.2
and	more	 and	more
Source: National Sample Survey Organization (55th Round, 1999-2000) Report No. 471, Nutritional Intake in India for calorie 
intake data by expenditure groups and Report No. 454, Household Consumer Expenditure in India - Key Results for the 
distribution of persons. The calorie intake data. refers to the 30 day recall so the distribution of persons by the same recall 
period is taken above. 
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him is much less than that run by others. For a valid comparison of 
the runners’ performance, the distance run has to be the same stand-
ardized distance for all the runners, and this is done by staggering 
the runners. similarly, in the official method the percent of persons 
below the same, standardized consumption level or levels, need to be 
compared but this is not the case in the indirect method. Rather, the 
method used implies that the percentages below un-standardized and 
changing consumption levels are sought to be compared over time 
(see Table 9). This is not legitimate, and any statement about decline 
(or change generally) is not valid. Present day heated debates between 
the estimators about whether poverty has ‘declined’ by ten points or 
seven points, when poverty has not declined at all, can be likened to 
debates over whether the inner-circle runner has ‘won’ by one metre 
or two metres, when the fact of the matter is that he has not ‘won’ at 
all, because the premise for valid comparison is violated. 
9 The analogy can be carried a little further. if the race is a short one over a straight 
segment of the course, lining the runners up in a straight line at the starting point is 
okay. similarly if the base year of the price index is very close, say two to three years, 
then comparison over time can be made using the official method –which ignores 
every non-base year actual calorie intake– without leading to too much inaccuracy. 
but for a long race (a base year further back in time) absence of standardization will 
arise and make comparison invalid. 
Table 9
The Rural Poor as Percent of Rural Population in India
1973
- 74
28th
1983
32th
1993
- 94
50th
1999
- 00
55th
2004
60th
MPCE (Poverty line) Rs
NSSRound
1973
- 74
28th
1983
32th
1993
- 94
50th
1999
- 00
55th
2004
60th
Using Official 
Definition
(<MPCE giving
2400 cals)
56.4 70.0 74.5 74.5 n.a 49 120 325 570 n.a
Official 
Estimates
56.4 45.7 37.3 27.4 20.3* 49 86 206 328 354
and Implied
Calorie ‘Norm’
2400 2060 1970 1890 n.a (1.0) (1.4) (1.6) (1.7) n.a
Source: First line calculated from NSS Reports on Consumer Expenditure, 50th Round 1993-4 and 55th Round 199-00.
MPCE is Monthly Per Capita Expenditure.
Note that base year 1973-74 is the only year the official definition was correctly applied.- in all later years the nutrition norm is 
continuously diluted. The same exercise can be carried out for urban India. (Figures in parentheses are the ratio of the expenditure 
actually required to access the calorie RDA, to the official poverty line).
* Provisional estimate, applying official poverty line of Rs.344 for 2004, to the ogive of persons by expenditure levels from NSS 60th 
Round, January – June 2004, Report No. 505 Household Consumer Expenditure in India, Statement 3.2 R.
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The official rural monthly poverty line expenditure for 2004 (obtained 
by updating the 1999-00 poverty line of Rs.328, using the CPiAL), is 
Rs.354 or Rs11.8 daily, equivalent to 26 Us cents at the prevailing ex-
change rate. This paltry amount will actually buy at most one bottle of 
water, but it is supposed to cover all expenditure on food, fuel, cloth-
ing, shelter, transport, health and education – in short all daily spend-
ing on goods and services for one person! Estimates of indian poverty 
for 1999-00, 55th Round, by some individual academics like A.Deaton 
(2003b, 367) and s.bhalla (2003) are even lower and imply a poverty-
line of 20 Us cents or less expenditure per day, one-fifth of the World 
bank’s dollar-a-day measure. There is no logic in arguing that purchas-
ing power parity should be considered and instead of one dollar there-
fore around one third of that should be taken as the local poverty line, 
for the comparison is not between advanced and developing countries 
at all but between developing and other developing countries. A quar-
ter U.s dollar in india purchases exactly as much as Rs.11 does, at the 
prevailing exchange rate, and a quarter Us dollar purchases exactly as 
much as 2 yuan does in China (whose current rural poverty line is also 
far too low at 2.2 yuan per day). Poverty level incomes in the UsA are 
not set three times higher than the Chinese or indian one, but are at 
least thirty times higher. 
obviously, it is not difficult for either the Planning Commission or 
the individual academics to ‘adjust’ indian poverty figures downwards 
when the consumption level embodied in the rural poverty line, is de-
pressed to such sub-human levels as Rs11 or less per day. Few people 
can actually survive long below these levels –those who are there today 
are on their way to early death. The poverty estimators should try a 
test on themselves. Let them be handed the weekly equivalent of their 
own estimated monthly poverty line –they need not even exert them-
selves to earn it as the poor are obliged to do– and let them spend only 
one week in a village living on that amount, which would range from 
Rs.60 to Rs, 80. since they will not be confident of drinking the local 
water all they would be able to buy would be a bottle of water a day 
and no food let alone other necessities. What they would undoubtedly 
gain from their one-week stay, would be weight loss. Urban poverty 
lines are almost equally unrealistic.
sometimes to justify the indirect method it is argued that the orig-
inal rural consumption norm of 2400 was ‘too high’. First, it is not ‘too 
high’ because the average intake of those below it works out to about 
1950 calories which is lower than in any other country in the world 
except the least developed countries. second, even if it is accepted for 
the sake of argument that it was ‘too high’ it does not justify compar-
ing 1999-2000 ‘poverty’ figures which are all those persons below 1890 
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calories intake, to those persons below 1970 calories intake in 1993-94 
and those persons below 2400 calories intake in 1973-74. 
by all means, let us consider lower norms, in fact take several al-
ternative norms including 2400, but when comparing over time, com-
pare the proportion of population under the same norm at the two 
points of time –for only then will the comparison be valid. The indi-
rect estimates fail on this simple but essential criterion of comparabil-
ity over time and those who nevertheless undertake such comparison 
are committing a logical fallacy –the fallacy of equivocation. This a 
well known type of verbal fallacy, in which the same term is used with 
two completely different meanings in the course of the argument, so 
the inference is not true. in this case, ‘poverty line’ was defined and 
initially calculated with respect to a nutrition norm, while ‘poverty 
line’ as actually calculated is de-linked from the norm, so the inference 
regarding change (whether rise, fall or constancy) is not true0.
Not only is the official comparison of poverty percentages, and 
claims of poverty reduction over time, quite spurious; the comparison 
of the poverty levels of states at a given point of time, is equally invalid. 
As Table 10 shows, we have a bizarre picture when we calculate the 
maximum calorie intake levels below which people are designated as 
‘poor’ by the official method in the different states of india. The calo-
rie intake corresponding to the official state-wise poverty lines, –from 
which the state poverty percentage have been officially derived– for the 
year 1999-2000, varies from 1440 only in kerala, nearly a thousand cal-
ories below RDA, to 2120 in orissa, less than 300 calories below RDA. 
The fact is that the official method in india today adheres to no 
nutrition norm at all. Nutrition has dropped out of the picture com-
pletely in the indirect method, nor is there any lower bound which 
is set, to the extent of decline in the calorie intake corresponding to 
whatever the price-adjusted poverty line happens to be. That is why 
we find states with 1500 calories or less intake corresponding to their 
official poverty lines in 1999-00. in as many as 9 states, the calorie 
intake associated with the official poverty lines was below 1800 calo-
ries in the 55th Round, while in four states it was 1600 calories or less 
(see Table 10). None of this is mentioned when poverty estimates are 
quoted by those making them. 
Not even the late P.V. sukhatme, who was a consistent critic of the 
2400 calorie RDA being too high, would have accepted 1800 calories 
as a reasonable norm for estimating who the poor are, –let alone 1600 
calories or less. he had used a norm of 2200 calories in one of his own 
10 i have discussed the fallacy of equivocation involved in the indirect estimates, in 
Patnaik 2005b. 
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estimates (sukhatme 1977). by 2004-05 the All-india official poverty 
line itself will correspond to an intake of 1800 calories or less, and at 
least eight states will have a 1600 or less calorie intake corresponding 
to the state-specific official poverty lines.
The fact that comparability conditions are blatantly violated, is 
obvious. officially it is inferred that poverty is much higher, for exam-
ple, in orissa at 48 percent, than in neighbouring Andhra Pradesh at 
only 11 percent. but how can we possibly infer that orissa is ‘poorer’ 
than Andhra, when the ‘officially poor’ are those persons with below 
2120 calories intake in orissa but the ‘officially poor’ are those persons 
with below 1600 calories intake in Andhra? (As a matter of fact the be-
low 2400 and below 2100 calories poverty percentages are both higher 
in Andhra than in orissa as the same Table shows in the last two col-
umns). similarly, how can it be inferred that rural Gujarat with only 
13 percent officially in poverty, is much better off than West bengal 
with 33 percent officially poor, when the associated calorie ‘norm’ in 
Gujarat has been pushed down to only 1680 compared to 1900 in West 
bengal? As a matter of fact the below 2400 calories poverty percentage 
is marginally lower for W.bengal compared to Gujarat and the below 
2100 calories percentage is substantially lower for W.bengal. And so 
the anomalies can be multiplied. Further, how can, for each state, the 
official estimate in 1999-00 be compared with that in 1993-94 and in-
ference about ‘decline’ be drawn, when the associated calorie intake 
has been lowered in each state? (Except only one, Gujarat). 
As a teacher if i were to follow the illogical procedure of saying 
that student A who has 53 percent marks is ‘better’ than student b 
who has 59 percent marks, because i apply a 50 out of 100 marks 
standard to student A and apply a different, 60 marks out of 100 stand-
ard to student b, i would rightly face a court case. Yet our Planning 
Commission and individual academics have been allowed to get away 
with making patently illogical and untrue statements on poverty. The 
Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission recently congratulated 
the Andhra Pradesh government on its success in reducing poverty. 
This ‘reduction’ was solely the effect of applying an extraordinarily 
low price-adjusted poverty line of Rs. 262 per month in 1999-00 at 
which less than 1600 calories could be accessed (see Table 10). Look-
ing directly at nutrition poverty, we find that the proportion of persons 
below 1800 calories intake in that state has doubled to 40% by 1999-00 
compared to 1983 (Table 11). To complete the story, the proportion 
below 2100 calories has risen to 62% at the later date, compared to 56 
% only five years earlier in 1993-4, and 44% in 1983. 
What is the reason, the reader might ask, for the official method pro-
ducing consistently lower estimates than the direct method, and why 
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has the divergence been growing until now, the indirect estimate gives 
only 27 percent compared to nearly 75 percent by the direct estimate. 
it is not primarily a matter of the price index used: different price indi-
ces do give different results but this accounts for difference of at most 
10 percent or so of population, not the difference of 48 percent of pop-
ulation which is actually observed. The basic reason is assuming an 
invariant consumption basket in the indirect method, held unchanged 
for three decades. over these three decades however there has been 
increasing monetization of the economy and disappearance of com-
mon property resources, along with higher cost of utilities and health 
care. With a given real income people have to spend relatively more 
on essential non-food requirements, overcoming illness and earning 
a living. The actual current rural consumption basket which satisfies 
the nutrition norm, and to which the total monthly expenditure on all 
goods and services corresponds, costs almost double the price-adjust-
ed poverty line (from Table 8 summarized in Table 9, at least Rs.570 
is required compare to the official Rs.328). The official poverty lines 
are simply far too low and are getting further lowered as the base year 
becomes more remote.
Rohini Nayyar (1991) in her careful doctoral study, estimated 
poverty using both methods and noted the widening divergence in 
the results between 1961-2 and 1977-8. she had taken some solace 
from the fact that though poverty levels estimated by the two different 
methods were moving apart quite fast, at least they did seem to move 
in the same direction over time. The ranking of the states of india ac-
cording to their poverty levels estimated using the two methods, was 
highly correlated: Nayyar found that spearman’s rank correlation co-
efficient worked out to 0.89 and 0.84 (using the official estimate on the 
one hand, and two different direct estimate norms of 2200 and 2000 
calories) and was significant at the 1% level. 
but in the 1990s this conclusion no longer holds. The poverty lev-
els calculated by the two methods are moving fast in opposite direc-
tions and the rank correlation may soon become negative. spearman’s 
rank correlation taking the poverty ranks of the states by the official 
indirect method, and by the direct method for 1999-2000, 55th Round 
data, works out to only 0.236 and 0.075 (using the same two direct 
estimate norms) and neither is statistically significant at the 1% level 
(Ram, 2004). inspection of Table 10 will tell the reader why this is the 
case: some of the states with the lowest official poverty, such as And-
hra Pradesh, a by-word for agrarian distress, have some of the high-
est actual poverty. in general the official method produces the largest 
divergence from the direct method, in the case of the southern and 
Eastern states.
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The rot in poverty studies discussions seems to have set in with 
neo-liberal reforms in india, particularly in the late 1990s. The indi-
an Government was eager to claim success for the economic reforms 
and the pro-reform economists were eager to see poverty reduction 
in the data. in such a milieu, the inconvenient direct estimates show-
ing high and in some states, increasing levels of poverty were swept 
under the carpet. Discussion of direct estimation of poverty virtually 
disappeared from the literature. The dominant trend of discussion 
focussed on the official indirect method, which, to the great satis-
faction of the pro-reform and the World bank estimators, not only 
showed very low ‘poverty’ levels but actual decline in these levels. 
Not one of the authors using the official indirect method, alluded 
to the nutritional implications of their own estimates. This meant 
that they were using and presenting the Nss data selectively, tak-
ing only the distribution of persons by expenditure classes to read 
off the poverty proportion corresponding to their indirect poverty 
line, while ignoring the associated energy intake figures completely. 
such lack of transparency and selective use of data, is not accept-
able academic procedure. owing to this lack of transparency, to this 
day most economists in india not directly working with the data, 
and including even those examining research theses on poverty, are 
not aware that drastically lowered consumption levels over time and 
arbitrary variation of consumption levels across states, are the nec-
essary implications of following the indirect method and arriving at 
low poverty estimates. They assume that the original norms are be-
ing followed when this is not true.
There is a debate among the academics following the official, indi-
rect method, that owing to change in the recall period during the 55th 
round, 1999-2000 compared to earlier Rounds, actual expenditure is 
slightly overstated in every expenditure class, and hence the distribu-
tion of persons by expenditure classes has been affected. Making the 
required adjustment for comparability alters the distribution slightly 
and raises the 27 percent below the Rs.328 official price –adjusted pov-
erty line, by another 2 to 3 percent (sundaram and Tendulkar, 2003, 
Deaton, 2003a, sen and himanshu 2005). if these adjustments are 
correct, quite obviously, the percentage of persons below the directly 
observed poverty line of Rs.570 would rise to an even greater extent 
than 2 to 3, since a higher proportion of people than before would 
also come into the expenditure interval Rs.328 to Rs 570, and thus 
the difference between official estimate and the direct estimate would 
increase further. Thus all those with less than 2400 calories intake per 
diem, in 1999-2000 would be more than 74.5 + 3 = 77.5 percent of 
rural population, which is a rise compared to 74.5 percent in the 50th 
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Round, 1993-94. similarly those below 2100 calories would rise from 
49.5 percent to more than 52.5 percent11.
however we have chosen to give the direct estimate for 1999-2000 
unadjusted for recall period in all our tables, since the main point be-
ing made in this section, is the type of mistake involved in the indirect 
method itself which is leaving out nearly half the rural poor, and this 
basic problem with all indirect estimates not only remains but gets 
further aggravated, whenever adjustments are made by the estimators 
on account of altered recall period. it may be noted that with the ad-
justment for recall period, they are leaving out more than 47 percent 
of the actually poor rural population from their set of ‘the poor’ while 
without the adjustment, they were leaving out exactly 47 percent of 
the population.
some economists who are critical of the official price-adjustment 
method, have put nutrition back at the centre of their analysis, but 
they have followed another direct poverty estimation route, as com-
pared to inspecting current Nss data –the method we have followed. 
They have estimated the minimum cost of accessing the calorie RDA 
on the basis of current nutrient prices, and thus have obtained a nor-
mative food expenditure. by comparing with the actual expenditure 
on food in the Nss, they arrive at the percentage of persons failing to 
reach the RDA and this is 66 percent at the All-india level for the 55th 
Round (see Coondoo, Majumdar, Lancaster and Ray 2004, Ray and 
Lancaster 2005). subramanian (2005) has used indirect method base 
years closer to the present, as well as the direct method we use, to see 
how the trends in poverty behave under alternative scenarios. 
Many critical voices (suryanarayana 1996, Mehta and Venkatara-
man 2000, swaminathan 1999, 2002) which had continued to draw at-
tention to the high prevalence of undernutrition and malnutrition, to 
the secular decline in average rural calorie intake, to high direct pov-
erty estimates using reasonable calorie norms and which criticized 
the indirect estimates, have been sought to be silenced by the pro-re-
form economists, by the simple expedient of ignoring them altogether. 
Not one critical author is referred to in the articles by those present-
ing their indirect estimates at a Conference and later collecting them 
in a special issue of The Economic and Political Weekly tendentiously 
titled ‘Poverty Reduction in the 1990s’ (Deaton 2003a, and 2003bTen-
dulkar and sundaram 2003 etc.). The only article on energy intake 
11 We could easily find out how much higher the direct estimate would be than 74.5 
percent if those making the adjustment to the distribution of persons by expenditure 
class, had bothered to present the associated average calorie intake by expenditure 
class. As usual however they ignore the nutrition part completely in their papers.
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Table 10
Official Poverty Percentage by States and Associated Calorie ‘Norm’
STATE
Indirect estimates, 1993-4 and 1999-00 
Direct Estimates,
1999-2000
1993-1994 1999-2000
< 2400 cal
Poverty 
Percentage
< 2100 cal
Poverty
Percentage
Official
Poverty
Percentage
Implied
Calorie
‘Norm’
Official
Poverty
Percentage
Implied
Calorie
‘Norm’
Andhra
Pradesh 15.92 1700 11.05 1590 84.0 62.0
Assam 45.01 1960 40.04 1790 91.0 71.0
Bihar 58.21 2275 44.30 2010 77.0 53.5
Gujarat 22.18 1650 13.17 1680 83.0 68.5
Haryana 28.02 1970 8.27 1720 47.5 30.5
Karnataka 29.88 1800 17.30 1600 82.0 50.0
Kerala 25.76 1630 9.38 1440 82.5 52.5
Madhya
Pradesh 40.64 1970 37.06 1850 78.5 55.0
Maharashtra 37.93 1780 23.72 1760 92.0 55.0
Orissa 49.72 2150 48.01 2120 79.0 45.5
Punjab 11.95 1810 6.35 1710 47.5 36.5
Rajasthan 26.46 2130 13.74 1925 53.5 27.5
Tamilnadu 32.48 1650 20.55 1510 94.5 76.0
Uttar
Pradesh 48.28 2220 31.22 2040 61.0 37.5
West	Bengal 40.80 2080 31.85 1900 81.0 55.0
ALL INDIA 37.27 1970 27.09 1890 74.5 49.5
Source: As Table 8. From the basic data by states, the ogive or cumulative frequency distribution of persons below specified per 
capita expenditure levels was plotted, and on the same graph the relation of per capita expenditure and per capita calorie intake was 
plotted. Calorie intake corresponding to the official estimates was then obtained from the graphs. Note that for 1993-94 the mid-point 
value of each expenditure class has been plotted against the per capita calorie intake as the arithmetic average was not available in 
the published tables. For 1999-2000 it was available and has been used in deriving the figures for 1999-00. We find that for several 
expenditure classes the mid-point value coincided with the arithmetic mean, and for the others the difference of mid-point value from 
mean was very small, suggesting that the same would be true for 1993-4.
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while juxtaposing the official and direct estimate does so somewhat 
uncritically12.
The critical writers on the other hand, have given cogent argu-
ments to suggest why per capita calorie intake should be involuntarily 
declining in the lower expenditure classes over time. (it is also declin-
ing in higher expenditure classes but the problems of the initially over-
fed who may be reducing intake, do not concern us at present). They 
have pointed out that there has been substantial monetization of the 
economy over the last three decades. Wages which used to be paid in 
12 Meenakshi and Viswanathan 2003 present ‘calorie deprivation’ as though it is 
an independent topic, not essentially related to official poverty estimates, and al-
though they usefully juxtapose their estimates of population below differing calorie 
norms, and the official estimates, they do not refer to the falling energy equivalent of 
the official or individual poverty lines over time which affects comparability. Their 
method of estimating the calorie distribution ogives using kernel density functions, 
gives higher estimates of population below various calorie norms, than our estimates 
using the grouped data and the simple method described in the note to Table 10. This 
is probably because their estimate includes all well-to-do persons who have lower 
calorie intake than RDA. There is no reason however to consider rich race jockeys, 
super models or anorexic people as part of the poor. 
Table 11
States which have seen rise in the percentage of persons with less than 1800
calories intake per day during period 1983 to 1999-2000, and states with over one-third
of population below 1800 calories intake at either date
Rural
38th Round, 1983
< 1800 calories
Percent of total Persons
55th Round, 1999-2000
< 1800 calories
Percent of total Persons
Andhra Pradesh 19.0 40.0
Assam 28.5 41.0
Haryana 8.5 10.5
Karnataka 24.5 35.5
Kerala 50.0 41.0
Madhya Pradesh 18.5 32.5
Maharashtra 20.5 28.0
Tamilnadu 54.0 50.0
West Bengal 38.0 22.5
Source: Abstracted from estimates for all states, using NSS Reports No.471 and 454 for 55th round, and Report Nos.387 and 353 for 
38th Round. Estimation method as in note to Table 10. Note that in 1983 only 3 states – Kerala, Tamilnadu and West Bengal had more 
than one-third of rural population below 1800 calories intake. By 1999-2000 all three states had improved, West Bengal substantially, 
while Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra saw worsening. Thus by 1999-00, five states had more 
than one third of population below 1800 calories intake (six if we include the borderline Madhya Pradesh).
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kind as grain or meals, valued at low farm-gate prices in earlier Nss 
Rounds, are now paid in cash which the labourer has to exchange for 
food at higher retail prices, and so can buy less of it for a given real 
income. Common property resources have disappeared over the last 
three decades : fuel wood and fodder, earlier gleaned and gathered 
(and not fully valued in the Nss data), now have to be purchased, 
restricting the ability of the poorer population, to satisfy basic food 
needs out of a given real income and leading to the observed energy 
intake decline. staple grains and fuelwood or other fuels are obviously, 
jointly demanded since no-one can eat raw grain, and with a given real 
income a part of expenditure on grain has to be enforcedly reduced to 
purchase fuel. To this we have to add higher medical, transport and 
education costs as state funding is reduced and some services are pri-
vatized. The correct thrust of these arguments is that under-nutrition 
and poverty is very high, affecting three-quarters of the rural popula-
tion by now, and observed calorie intake decline for the lower fractiles 
is non-voluntary. by 1999-2000 for the first time average calorie intake 
in rural india has fallen below average urban calorie intake.
Concluding Remarks
This paper has embarked on a brief but sharp critique of the preva-
lent analysis and prescriptions regarding food security and poverty, 
because of two reasons. First, the agrarian crisis is serious and wide-
spread, and has been created by public policies which have been de-
flationary, combined with trade liberalization when world primary 
prices have been declining. it is manifesting itself in slowing output 
growth, rising unemployment, unprecedented income deflation for 
the majority of cultivators and labourers, enmeshing of cultivators in 
unrepayable debt, and loss of assets including land, to creditors. kid-
ney sales and nine thousand recorded farmer suicides are only the tip 
of the iceberg of increasing deprivation, a crucial index of which is 
an unprecedented fall in foodgrains absorption to levels prevalent 50 
years ago, and decline in average calorie intake in rural india. 
second, the prevalent analysis by policy makers, the Planning 
Commission and the government, however, can be summed up as an 
obdurate refusal to face the facts, and an attempt to construct a coun-
ter-factual fairy story which is illogical and in patent contradiction 
with the trends in the economy. “We must learn truth from facts” (Mao 
ZeDong) “or the facts will punish us” (added by Deng hsiao Ping) is 
a dictum that our policy makers would do well to bear in mind. Their 
theorization interprets severe loss of purchasing power and enforced 
decline in effective demand for food grains, as its very opposite, as 
‘over-production’ in relation to an allegedly voluntary reduction of 
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foodgrains intake by all segments of the population, and reaches 
the dangerous inference that foodgrains output should be cut back. 
it refuses to recognize that, while in developed societies, consumers 
can be separated from a minority who are agricultural producers, in 
a poor country like india the majority of consumers are themselves 
rural and directly involved in production as cultivators and labourers, 
so deflationary policies hit them hard in both these roles of producers 
and consumers. Price deflation does not benefit even landless labour-
ers since it is part of a process of income deflation which raises unem-
ployment faster than prices fall. our economists estimating poverty 
by the indirect method are still caught in the old conceptual trap of 
equating relative food price decline with declining poverty, without 
understanding that the adverse unemployment effects of deflation can 
swamp out any benefit of food price fall: they should study the eco-
nomics of the Great Depression for some insights into how deflation-
ary processes actually operate. 
As Table 11 shows, by 1999-2000 as many as five states had more 
than one-third of rural population below 1800 calories intake, and in 
another three states the percentage of persons with below 1800 calories 
intake, had risen between 1983 and 1999-00, though not exceeding one-
third at the latter date. (Note that Meenakshi and Viswanathan, 2003, 
obtain a larger number than we do, eight states with more than one-
third of population below 1800 calories in the 55th Round –but their use 
of kernel density functions to obtain the calorie distribution ogive, is 
perhaps overestimating the nutrition poverty figures, since their meth-
od includes all high income but calorie deficient people as well).
Despite this worsening situation at the ground level being reflect-
ed in the nutrition data, it would be very sad indeed if the present 
Planning Commission is tempted to make further spurious claims of 
‘poverty reduction’ as the previous ones had done, the moment the 
next large-sample Nss data on consumption becomes available. Their 
indirect method –which selectively uses the data by ignoring the nutri-
tion part of it– is bound to show a further steep and spurious ‘decline’ 
in rural poverty by 2005-06, to around 18-19 percent of rural popula-
tion from 27.4 percent in 1999-2000. 
This is because, owing to the unprecedented income deflationary 
situation itself, the rise in prices has been at a historic low between 
2000 to date. The CPiAL actually declined in 2000-01 compared to 
the previous year, and rose only 1 percent the next year. With low in-
flation, the CPiAL adjusted official poverty lines for 2003 and 2004 
works out to only Rs. 342 and Rs. 354, a mere Rs. 14 and Rs.26 more 
than the Rs.328 of 1999-00. The already published 58th Round Nss 
data relating to 2002-03 had shown that only 22 percent of all –india 
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rural population was below Rs. 342, a share which is falling further 
every year, solely because few persons can survive at such low levels 
of spending– it is indeed amazing that there are people surviving at 
all on less than Rs.11.5 per day. one can imagine how adverse their 
height, weight, morbidity rates and life expectancy would be relative 
to the average. 
it is no surprise that in fact the latest 60th Round consumption 
data covering January-June 2004, which has been released as Report 
No.505 by the Nss in end November 2005, shows that now only 23 
percent of all persons in rural india are below Rs. 354 monthly per 
capita expenditure, the poverty line for 2004 if schedule 1 is used and 
only 17.5 percent is below the same poverty line if schedule 2 is used. 
While this is a thin sample, it is adequate for the all-india estimates 
of course, this will be necessarily associated with a further fall in the 
calorie intake level corresponding to the official poverty line, from 
1890 calories to somewhere around or below 1800 calories, in short at 
least 600 calories below RDA. This information of declining nutrition 
standard associated with the official estimate is likely to be quietly 
suppressed as it has been in the past. The Government should bear in 
mind however, that any claims of ‘poverty reduction’ it might be mis-
guided enough to make, will no longer carry credibility since the ar-
bitrary and illogical nature of its method of calculation is today much 
better understood, and the contrast of any such claims, with all other 
adverse trends in the rural economy is too glaring to be ignored. 
since such a large fraction of the population is already at very low 
energy intake levels, they have been trying to maintain consumption 
by liquidating assets against debt. Thus there are not only adverse 
flow adjustment (lowered nutrition levels) but also stock adjustments 
going on, reflected in the emerging recent data on rising landlessness. 
We may expect to see rise in the already high concentration of assets 
in rural areas. in such a scenario labour bondedness against debt is 
also likely to be increasing.
The Tenth Plan, 1992 to 1997 sets out that Rs, 300, 000 crores are 
to be spent by the Centre on Rural Development Expenditures (adding 
up as before three items)13. Three years of the Plan or two-thirds of 
the period is over: Rs.100,000 crores or only one-third of the planned 
outlays have been spent, of which Rs.85,000 crores spending was dur-
ing the last two years of NDA rule, mid- 2002 to mid-2004, while there 
was a sharp cut-back to Rs. 15,000 crores only in 2004-05. As in 1991 
the first years after a general election are being used by the neo-liberal 
13 Namely, agriculture and rural development, irrigation and flood control, 
village and small scale industry.
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lobby in the new government which controls finance, to apply mind-
less deflation although unlike 1991 there is deep agrarian crisis today. 
This cynical move to cut rural development expenditures in the face 
of rising unemployment and agrarian distress, can only be in order 
to please international financial institutions and meet the arbitrary 
provisions of the FRbM Act. 
To achieve the 10th Plan target now, at least Rs.100,000 crores 
must be spent both in 2005-06 and 2006-07, of which about 25 to 30 
thousand crores should be on universal employment guarantee and 70 
to 75 thousand crores on rural development expenditures. This level 
of planned spending would total only about 2.5 percent of NNP and 
it needs to be stepped up steadily in later years to reach the 4 percent 
of NNP which prevailed in the late 1980s during 7th Plan before eco-
nomic reforms began.
When actual rural poverty is so high as nearly four-fifths of the 
population, and poverty depth is increasing with a higher proportion 
of people being pushed down into lower nutritional levels, there is 
no economic rationale for continuing with a targeted public distribu-
tion system. indeed as i have long argued, apart from the deflationary 
policies and exposure to the falling global prices, another reason for 
the denial of affordable food grains to the poor has been targeting us-
ing the arbitrary official poverty estimates. The reversal to a demand 
driven universal PDs is essential for rectifying the initial mistake 
made in 1997.but a demand driven universal PDs will work well only 
if mass purchasing power which has been greatly eroded over the last 
fifteen years, is restored through the implementation of a properly 
funded National Rural Employment Guarantee Act. The Act has been 
passed and implementation has started from Feb1. 2006. Within a 
month, 4 million persons have already registered to offer themselves 
for work. but the scheme cannot be said to be properly funded at all. A 
number of economists had pointed out that between Rs. 25,000 crores 
to Rs.30,000 crores was the order of annual expenditure required to 
give a genuine boost to employment and incomes after taking all mul-
tiplier effects into account. This could have been easily undertaken 
since tax receipts even at unchanged tax rates, have been buoyant, 
owing mainly to the rich getting considerably richer in recent years. 
but those controlling the government’s finances have already dem-
onstrated their lack of concern for dealing actively with the agrar-
ian crisis. All pre-existing employment creating programmes such as 
sGRY, JRY14 and all food-for-work programmes which together had 
accounted for Rs 11.7 thousand crores of the central government’s 
14 sGRY is sampoorna Grameen Rozgar Yojana, JRY is Jawahar Rozgar Yojana. 
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expenditure in 2005-06, have been subsumed under and merged with 
the National Rural Employment Guarantee programme in the Febru-
ary 2006 budget proposals for fiscal 2006-07, and the total allocation 
to this is a mere Rs12.9 thousand crores, exactly one-tenth higher than 
in the previous year. This is in accordance with the prevailing defla-
tionist sentiments of those controlling the government’s finances and 
seeking to implement the bWi directives to reduce the fiscal deficit, 
but this continuing deflationist stance is detrimental to the effective 
implementation of the Act. The prognosis therefore remains far from 
encouraging: the agrarian crisis is not being addressed actively and 
the trend of increasing poverty depth is unlikely to be reversed unless 
public pressure is mounted to increase the funding of the NREG sub-
stantially to implement the Act.
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